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This paper introduces quantum multiparty protocols
which allow the use of temporary assumptions. We prove
that secure quantum multiparty computations are possible
if and only if classical multi party computations work. But
these strict assumptions are necessary only during the execu-
tion of the protocol and can be loosened after termination of
the protocol.
We consider two settings:
1. A collusion of players tries to learn the secret inputs
of honest players or tries to modify the result of the
computation.
2. A collusion of players cheats in the above way or tries
to disrupt the protocol, i. e., the collusion tries to abort
the computation or leaks information to honest players.
We give bounds on the collusions tolerable after a protocol
has terminated and we state protocols reaching these bounds.
03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Due
to the no-go theorems of Mayers and Lo/Chau [28,24]
and Lo [23] quantum cryptography cannot—with uncon-
ditional security—implement bit commitment, oblivious
transfer and many other important two party protocols.
Here we give an analysis of the case of multiparty pro-
tocols.
We will investigate two settings. First multiparty pro-
tocols which we call partially robust, which can tolerate
all forms of cheating, but can be aborted by a collusion
of disruptors and secondly we will consider multiparty
protocols which are robust even against disruption [29].
In the case without disruption classical multiparty pro-
tocols can yield unconditional security against all possi-
ble forms of cheating if a majority of the players is hon-
est and one assumes private channels between any two
parties as well as a broadcast channel [2,10,32]. More
general for every set of possibly colluding parties secure
multiparty computations are possible if no two collusions
cover the total set of players [16].
From the no-go theorems for quantum two party proto-
cols it can be concluded that there exist functions which
cannot be realized by secure quantum multiparty pro-
tocols if two sets of possibly colluding parties cover the
complete set of players. If the possible collusions are only
defined by their cardinality multiparty protocols using
quantum cryptography become insecure if not a major-
ity of players behave honestly.
Still quantum multiparty protocols have advantages
over classical multiparty protocols. In this paper we
prove that the assumptions about possible collusions can
be loosened after the execution of the protocol. We
present protocols where a majority may become dishon-
est after the protocol has terminated. Furthermore we
give a limit on the collusions which are tolerable after
the execution of the protocol. These bounds depend on
the collusions which are tolerable during the execution of
the protocol.
In the case with disruption we need that no two possi-
ble collusions cover all but one players, i. e., the cardinal-
ity of the union of two collusions never reaches n− 1 for
|P | = n. Given this assumption we can again prove that
the assumptions about possible collusions can be loos-
ened after the execution of the protocol. We also give
limits on the collusions which are tolerable after the ex-
ecution of the protocol and prove that these limits are
tight.
We will restrict our view mostly to realizing a bit com-
mitment from one party (called Alice) to a party named
Bob. For our impossibility results we simply prove that
relative to the given assumptions there cannot exist a
multiparty protocol realizing a bit commitment from Al-
ice to Bob. This implies that under the given assump-
tions there exist functions which cannot be computed se-
curely. For the constructive results it is again enough to
look at bit commiment, because with a result of Yao [34]
we can realize an oblivious transfer channel using a quan-
tum channel and bit commitments. With such an obliv-
ious transfer channel between every pair of players we
can realize multiparty computations, even with a dishon-
est majority [1,14,13,29]. Our concern will hence be to
characterize the assumptions relative to which a bit com-
mitment between two of the players becomes possible.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II
we will review definitions and known results on classi-
cal multiparty protocols and secret sharing techniques
as far as we need them to prove our results. Next, in
Section III we review the impossiblity of quantum bit
commitment in the two party scenario [28,24]. We give
some generalizations to the situation of multiparty pro-
tocols. In Section IV we stress the cryptographic im-
portance of assumptions which can be loosened after a
limited time, so called temporary assumptions. Then in
the Sections V,VI, VII we give protocols which allow tem-
porary assumptions in secure multiparty computations.
The main idea is to use a classical secret sharing scheme
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as a bit commitment protocol to force honest measure-
ments. We show that, after the honest measurements are
performed, the assumptions about possible collusions can
be loosened.
II. CLASSICAL MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS
AND SECRET SHARING
A. Classical Multiparty Computations
In a multiparty protocol a set P of players wants to cor-
rectly compute a function f(a1, . . . , an) which depends
on secret inputs of n players. Some players might col-
lude to cheat in the protocol as to obtain information
about secret inputs of the other players or to modify the
result of the computation.
When we look at the infrastructure available for the
players we are mainly interested in three settings. First,
there are private and authenticated channels between ev-
ery pair of players and each player has a broadcast chan-
nel, second, every pair of players is connected by an obliv-
ious transfer channel and a broadcast channel is available
for everyone, and third, which is the setting for the re-
sults of this paper, every two players are connected by a
quantum channel and an insecure but authenticated clas-
sical channel plus every player has access to a broadcast
channel.
In multiparty computations we have to make some as-
sumptions about possible collusions. We model possible
collusions by defining a set of collusions. Only one of
these possible collusions is actually cheating. Within this
set of colluding players the players share their input and
take actions based on their common knowledge.
Definition 1 An adversary structure is a monotone set
A ⊆ 2P , i. e., for a subset S′ of a set S ⊆ P the property
S ∈ A implies S′ ∈ A.
The main properties of a multiparty protocol are:
1. A multiparty protocol is said to be A-secure if no
single collusion fromA is able to obtain information
about the secret inputs of other participants which
cannot be derived from the result and the inputs of
the colluding players.
2. A multiparty protocol is A-partially correct if no
party can let the protocol terminate with a wrong
result.
3. A multiparty protocol is A-correct whenever no sin-
gle collusion from A can abort the protocol, modify
its result, or deviate from the protocol in a way that
an honest player obtains information about the se-
cret inputs of another player which cannot be de-
rived from the result and the input of this honest
player.
4. A multiparty protocol is called A-fair if no collu-
sion from A can reconstruct the result of the multi
party computation earlier then all honest partici-
pants together. No collusion should be able to run
off with the result.
A multiparty protocol having the properties 1., 2. and
4. is called A-partially robust and a protocol having all
three above properties is called A-robust.
Whenever we are only concerned with partially robust
protocols we will abort the protocol whenever a player
complains about another player. Only robust protocols
must be able to cope with conflicts between players.
Note that we allow only one collusion from A to cheat.
Furthermore active cheaters are always be considered to
be passively cheating, too.
Sometimes one thinks of all players being equivalent
in their trustability, then adversary structures are solely
defined by the cardinality of the collusions. When refer-
ing to an adversary structure which contains all subsets
of P with no more than t players we denote the above
properties by
(
n
t
)
-secure,
(
n
t
)
-(partially) correct,
(
n
t
)
-fair,
and
(
n
t
)
-robust1.
B. Multiparty Computations with Private Channels
We will summarize next what can be achieved by clas-
sical multiparty computations when private channels are
available between any two players as well as a broadcast
channel. The next result is taken from [16].
Theorem 2 Given a set P of players with a secure and
authenticated channel between each pair of players to-
gether with a broadcast cannel, then every function can
be computed by an A-partially robust multiparty protocol
if no two sets from A cover the complete set P of players.
Remark 3 There exist functions for which a multiparty
protocol among players who have access to a broadcast
channel and have secure and authenticated channels con-
necting every pair of players cannot be A-robust if two
collusions cover P \ {Pi} for some player Pi.
Proof: If the players of two possible collusions
A1, A2 ∈ A covering P \ {Pi} cannot cooperate then it
is not clear for Pi which collusion is cheating. To con-
tinue with the protocol all messages between players who
are complaing about each other have to be exchanged
over the broadcast channel or over secure channels via
Pi. Obviously Pi learns all secrets or the protocol must
1Sometimes the terms t-secure, t-(partially) correct, t-fair,
and t-robust are used for
(
n
t−1
)
-secure,
(
n
t−1
)
-correct,
(
n
t−1
)
-
fair, and
(
n
t−1
)
-robust
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be aborted. In both cases the protocol is not A-robust.
✷
As a corollary we state the classic result from [2,10]
which was generalized to the situation with broadcast
channel in [32].
Corollary 4 Given n players which have a secure and
authenticated channel between each pair of players to-
gether with a broadcast cannel, then every function can
be computed by a
(
n
t
)
-partially robust multiparty protocol
if t < n/2, i. e., if a majority is honest.
C. Secret Sharing
One important primitive of classical multiparty proto-
cols is secret sharing which was introduced in [33,7]. The
aim of a secret sharing scheme is to allow a dealer to dis-
tribute shares s1, s2, . . . , sn, which represent one secret
value x, to a set P of players such that only certain au-
thorized subsets of P can reconstruct the secret x whereas
all other subsets of P can’t get any information about x.
Of course every subset of P containing an authorized set
must also be authorized. This leads to the definition of
an access structure.
Definition 5 An access structure is a set Z ⊆ 2P for
which for subsets S′ ⊇ S of P the property S ∈ Z implies
S′ ∈ Z.
An acess structure is “dual” to an adversary structure.
If A is an adversary structure then the set {Ac|A ∈ A}
forms an access structure.
The first access structures which were studied were de-
fined by the cardinality of their minimal authorized sets.
Later secret sharing schemes were constructed for arbi-
trary access structures [18,3].
For our protocol it is especially important to be able
to keep the dealer from deliberately handing out faulty
shares. Shares which do not match the agreed on access
structure.
This problem can be overcome by verifiable secret shar-
ing [4,10,6,16] which allows a verifier (e. g. each individ-
ual player) to check if a share he received is a valid share.
As we will use it later we sketch a verifiable secret
sharing scheme from [4] which can be used for every ho-
momorphic secret sharing scheme. I. e., for every scheme
where the secrets form an additive group and sharing is
a group homomorphism.
Verifiable Secret Sharing(m)
1. Alice shares a secret m with access structureZ.
2. for j = 1 to k do
(a) Alice shares a random secret z with the access
structure Z.
(b) The verifier tells Alice to either open z or z ⊕
m.
(c) Alice publishes the shares for z or z ⊕m.
od
If no player complains about the shares Alice publishes
and if the shares published were correct shares then the
verifier is convinced that all honest players hold correct
shares.
It is clear that the secret m is shared correctly if z is
shared correctly and z ⊕ m is shared correctly. A dis-
honest dealer will be caught cheating with a probability
of 1
2
in every of the k iterations. Hence the probability
to pass this test with an incorrectly shared secret is 2−k
and thus negligible in k.
D. Multiparty Computations with Oblivious
Transfer
Given an oblivious transfer channel all secure two party
computations become possible with unconditional secu-
rity [22]. This result was generalized to allow multiparty
computations with a dishonest majority [1,14,13]. One
obvious problem with such protocols is that if a majority
of players cannot run off with the secret, i. e., they can-
not reconstruct the secret on their own, then a minority
of players can abort the protocol. For this reason we de-
fined a multiparty protocol to be A-partially correct if no
collusion from A can make the protocol terminate with
a wrong result.
The result of [1,14,13] can then be stated as
Theorem 6 Given an oblivious transfer channel between
any two players as well as a broadcast channel, then every
function can be realized by a ∅-robust, 2P -secure, 2P -fair,
and 2P -partially correct multiparty protocol.
In multiparty protocols the inputs are usually shared
by a secret sharing scheme and the result is computed
locally on the shares and by sharing intermediate re-
sults. In [1,14,13] the players are committed to the shares
they hold. The computation in [13] uses a global com-
mitted oblivious tranfer, which is constructed there, to
implement NOT and AND gates directly on the commit-
ments. As the players are unable to cheat in the global
committed oblivious tranfer and the players cannot open
their commitments faultily every form of cheating is de-
tectable. The only problem is that it is not always clear
who is cheating. In [29] more robust protocols based on
oblivious transfer were analyzed. There is a trade off be-
tween robustness and security as stated in the following
result which are taken from [29].
Lemma 7 Let P be a set of n players with every pair of
players being connected by an oblivious transfer channel
and every player having access to a broadcast channel.
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Let A and A˜ be adversary structures, then for all func-
tions A-robust and A˜-secure multiparty protocols exist if
1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets
covering P \ {Pi} for any Pi ∈ P and
2. the adversary structure A˜ contains only the com-
plement of one previously chosen set B which is
maximal in A.
For a proof see [29]
In the above result one can see the trade off between
robustness and security. The smaller A can be chosen
the larger A˜ will be.
Corollary 8 The protocol of Lemma 7 for the computa-
tion of a function f(a1, . . . , an) is efficient in the number
of players and the size of the circuit used to calculate
f(a1, . . . , an).
For a proof see [29].
III. NO-GO RESULTS
A. Quantum Bit Commitment Is Impossible
In this section we will shortly review the impossibility
of quantum bit commitment as proven by Mayers and
Lo/Chau.
Definition 9 A bit commitment protocol is a protocol
consisting of two phases: commit and unveil. In the
commit phase Bob obtains information from Alice which
binds her to a certain bit b. In the unveil phase Alice
opens b to Bob and proves to Bob that the commitment
bound her to the bit b.
A bit commitment protocol must have two properties:
1. binding, i. e., after committing Alice can, without
the help of Bob, only unveil one fixed bit b.
2. concealing, i. e., without the help of Alice Bob can-
not know the bit b Alice committed to.
To show the impossibility of quantum bit commitment
one proceeds in two steps
1. First one shows that for each quantum protocol
there exists a protocol which keeps all actions at the
quantum level and postpones all measurements and
random choices until shortly before unveil. This
protocol is secure (binding and concealing) if and
only if the original protocol was secure.
2. Then it is proven that (in the new protocol) either
Bob can from his part of the quantum state dis-
tinguish between a comitted zero and a committed
one (the protocol is not concealing) or Alice can
with a quantum transformation change her part of
the quantum state from a superposition of commit-
ments to zero into a superposition of commitments
of one (and vice versa).
A key insight in the impossibility proofs given in [28,24]
was that for each quantum protocol which involves mea-
surements, random choices, and classical communication
one can construct an equivalent protocol which has all
measurements and random choices postponed to shortly
before the unveil phase. With this reduction it is possible
to treat the result of the commit phase as being a pure
quantum state shared by Alice and Bob.
We will shortly explain the attack in more detail. Spe-
cial emphasis is put on on classical communication dur-
ing the protocol, as it involves measurements. But again
these measurements can theoretically be delayed.
Alice behaves like she wants to honestly commit to
zero and Bob behaves like an honest Bob, but all deci-
sions which have to be made in the course of the protocol
will no more be based on measurement results (or ran-
dom choices), but will be done by conditional quantum
gates [15] hence keeping all possibilities in superposition
up to the measurement shortly before the unveil phase.
Random choices are done in the same way, instead of fix-
ing one value all possible values should be created in su-
perposition. The most critical part of the reduction con-
cerns classical communication. To get this classical data
one must perform a measurement but even this measure-
ment can be delayed to shortly before the unveil phase
without changing the security of the protocol. Instead
of measuring a qubit Alice entangles this qubit with two
new qubits such that all three qubits give the same mea-
surement result in the basis which should be used for the
measurement (this is done by two controlled not) and
sends one of these new qubits to Bob. This way Bob gets
the information, and Alice can measure what informa-
tion Bob got, but these measurements can be postponed
without changing the security of the protocol.
If both parties follow this technique to keep everything
at the quantum level, then the protocol will deliver, after
the commit phase, a pure state shared by Alice and Bob.
This pure state |Ψ0〉 appears on Alice side as a mixture
ρAlice,0 (the index zero reminds us that Alice has com-
mitted to zero, the states |Ψ1〉 and ρAlice,1 correspond
to a commitment of one). On Bobs side the pure state
appears as ρBob.
Now we can import a result from [17].
Theorem 10 (Hughston, Jozsa, and Wootters)
Given two pure quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 shared be-
tween Alice and Bob which appear as the same state ρ on
Bob’s side, then there exists a unitary transform U|ψ〉,|φ〉
which acts on Alices part of the quantum system only and
changes |ψ〉 to |φ〉.
This result was generalized by Mayers to the case
where |ψ〉 and |φ〉 do not appear as the same state on
Bob’s side but as states which are very close to each
other [26].
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In the case of bit commitment this says that either
the bit can be measured on Bob’s side, i. e., ρBob looks
different for |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉, or Alice can change from
|Ψ0〉 to |Ψ1〉 by a unitary transform U0,1 on her part of
the quantum system.
We can conclude the impossibility result from [28,24].
Theorem 11 (Mayers, Lo/Chau) A quantum proto-
col for bit commitment cannot be binding and concealing.
To cheat in the actual protocol it is of course not nec-
essary that both parties keep their decisions at the quan-
tum levels. It is enough if the party being able to cheat
does so. See also Lemma 15.
B. Bounds on Tolerable Adversary Structures
During the Execution of a Protocol
With the impossibility results for the two party case
one can as well show that quantum cryptography cannot
enhance classical bounds for the set of tolerable adver-
saries [16].
Corollary 12 Let P be a set of players and let A be an
adversary structure. If there exist two possible collusions
A1, A2 ∈ A with A1 ∪ A2 = P then not all functions can
be computed A-partially robustly by a quantum multiparty
protocol.
Proof: We show that it is impossible to realize a bit
commitment for a party Alice ∈ A1 and Bob ∈ A2. This
is simple as we are almost in the two party scenario: As-
sume the collusion A2 can by no means measure the bit
Alice committed to, then the collusion A1 can, by keeping
every action at the quantum level cheat analogously to
the two party situation, i.e., there exists a unitary trans-
form U0→1 which can change the bit Alice is committed
to. The transform U0→1 must be jointly applied by all
players in A1 ✷
Corollary 13 There exist functions which cannot be
computed
(
n
t
)
-partially robustly by a quantum multiparty
protocol if t ≥ n/2.
If we consider robustness we have to take into account
more deviations from the protocol. A collusion of players
could for example leak their secret (quantum) data to a
player not in the collusion. Such an attack further limits
the set A of possible collusions.
Corollary 14 Let P be a set of players and let A be an
adversary structure. If there exist two possible collusions
A1, A2 ∈ A with A1 ∪ A2 = P \ {Pi} for any player Pi,
then not all functions can be computed A-robustly by a
quantum multiparty protocol.
Proof: Assume there exists a Pi ∈ P with P = A1 ∪
A2 ∪ {Pi} for A1, A2 ∈ A. We would like to implement
a bit commitment from a player from A2 to the player
Pi. To prevent the players from A2 to jointly change the
committed bit it must be possible for the players of A1 ∪
{Pi} to measure the committed bit. Only the assumption
that Pi does not collude with the players of A1 makes
this attack impossible. If the player Pi is honest but
curious and keeps everything at the quantum level, then
he would be able to measure the committed bit if all
players of the set A1 would together keep all their actions
at the quantum level and later on give all their quantum
information to the player Pi.
Even though the player Pi does not collude with the
players from A1 we cannot keep the players from A1 from
deviating from the protocol in giving away their secret
data. ✷
C. Bounds on Tolerable Adversary Structures After
the Protocol Terminated
During the execution of a protocol we must use the
same assumptions as in classical multiparty protocols to
obtain unconditional security. We will next prove bounds
on the set of tolerable collusions after a protocol has
been finished. In our case: after the commit phase of a
commitment protocol has terminated. Interestingly these
bounds are different.
To apply the attack of Mayers and Lo/Chau Alice need
not keep every action at the quantum level. She can per-
form measurements which yield not enough information
to, together with the quantum information Bob has, be
able to distinguish between the commitments zero and
one. In short Alice can perform any measurement whose
result she could tell Bob without giving away her secret
commitment.
Lemma 15 : Let |Ψb〉 be a pure quantum state shared
between Alice and Bob which is the result of a quantum bit
commitment protocol which was executed at the quantum
level.
If Alice can change the bit she committed to by a uni-
tary transform U0→1 on her part of |Ψb〉 then she can still
change the bit after she performed a measurement on her
part of the quantum state if the information obtained by
this measurement together with the quantum information
Bob holds does not allow to distinguish between the com-
mitments zero and one.
Proof: One can define a bit commitment protocol
where Alice has to perform this measurement and send
the information measured to Bob. As Bob can still not
distinguish between the commitments zero and one the
attack of Mayers, Lo/Chau applies and there exists a
unitary transform changing the bit. ✷
This simple result helps us to prove that temporarily
having an honest but curious third party does not allow
us to implement bit commitment [31].
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Lemma 16 Bit commitment may be implemented be-
tween Alice and Bob if we introduce a trusted third party,
but the assumption of having an honest but curious third
party is not a temporary assumption.
Proof: If the honest but curious party remains inde-
pendent of the two parties Alice and Bob bit commitment
can be implemented by classical multiparty protocols.
Now assume the honest but curious third party joins
Alice or Bob after the commit phase is completed.
The honest but curious third party will follow the pro-
tocol, but leave everything in superposition which need
not be sent away as classical data. So the third party
will perform some measurements. The third party can
join Bob afterwards and Bob should still be unable to
recover Alices bit. Hence the third party did only ob-
tain measurement results which are of no use for Bob.
Hence if the third party joins Alice we are in the situa-
tion of Lemma 15. Alice together with the third party
can jointly perform a unitary transform which changes
the bit Alice committed to. ✷
Lemma 16 can be generalized to the multiparty sce-
nario.
Proposition 17 There exist functions for which no
quantum multiparty protocol, which is partially robust
against the adversary structure A can afterwards become
secure against an adversary structure which contains two
complements of sets in A.
Proof: Let A1, A2 ∈ A denote two sets of possibly col-
luding players and let A˜ be an adversary structure con-
taining the complements of A1 and A2. We show that
it is impossible to implement an oblivious transfer from
Alice ∈ A1 to Bob ∈ A2 which is A-partially robust and
A˜-secure after termination. Assume such an oblivious
transfer were possible then we could with it implement a
bit commitment from Alice to Bob which is A-partially
robust during the commit phase and A˜-partially robust
up to the unveil phase. This is easy to see as after termi-
nation of the commit phase security is the only critical
issue. The data computed during the commit phase can-
not be changed any more and fairness is not of interest
until the unveil phase.
It remains to be proven that a bit commitment from
the player Alice ∈ A1 to the player Bob ∈ A2 \A1 is im-
possible. We look at the sets A1, A2\A1 and P \(A1∪A2)
and prove the impossibility analogously to Lemma 16.
During the execution of the commit phase the protocol
is A-partially robust hence we can assume that the play-
ers in A1 or the players in A2 \A1 collude and we still get
a valid commitment from A1 to A2 \A1. Now we assume
the protocol to become A˜-partially robust afterwards.
Then all players from P \ (A1 ∪A2) may join the players
from A2\A1 and the bit commitment remains concealing
even if the players from A2 \A1 were colluding. Hence all
quantum information in the posession of the players from
P\(A1∪A2) are of no use to Bob. According to Lemma 15
the players from A1 ∪ P \ (A1 ∪ A2) = P \ A2 = Ac2 can
change the committed bit. Hence the bit commitment is
not A˜-partially robust between commit and unveil. ✷
Corollary 18 There exist functions for which no
(
n
t
)
-
robust quantum multiparty protocol can become
(
n
n−t
)
-
robust after its execution.
IV. TEMPORARY ASSUMPTIONS
Usually assumptions have to be made very carefully,
because they implicitely try to predict future develope-
ments. The assumptions must be valid as long as the
secret information is critical.
Temporary assumptions are hence very promising.
There was little research into temporary assumptions in
quantum cryptography after it became clear that com-
putational assumptions cannot be used only temptorar-
ily [9].
But quantum cryptography allows assumptions which
are independent of computational assumptions. Such as-
sumptions can be temporary.
The key idea to get temporary assumptions is to not
try to make the transformation U0,1, which can change
the committed bit, impossible, but to make it impossible
for the parties (at least for the party able to cheat) to
keep all actions at the quantum level.
E. g. Alice can trivially not cheat in the protocol of [5]
if she has no quantum storage, even if quantum storage
became available to her after the commit phase.
Assumptions which have the same effect are: limited
quantum storage capacity and limited storage time for
quantum bits as well as assumptions about decay intro-
ducing errors. Such assumptions need only hold during
the execution of the protocol.
V. FORCING MEASUREMENTS WITH SECRET
SHARING
In [34] Yao proved that it is possible to obtain oblivious
transfer from a black box bit commitment and a quantum
channel. The idea goes back to Crepeau [11] and was
generalized to quantum channels which can have noise
by Mayers [25].
The basic idea is to force measurements to avoid the
attacks of Mayers and Lo/Chau and Lo [28,24,23]. In
the course of the protocol one party has to commit to the
measurment bases used and to the results obtained. Then
a random subset of these measurments are opened. If
there are not too many discrepancies one can be sure that
the committing party did measure most of the qubits.
This already suffices to make the delay of all measure-
ments impossible hence avoiding the attacks of Mayers
and Lo/Chau and Lo [34,25]. But one has to be care-
ful if the bit commitment used is strong enough to force
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measurements. The unconditionally secure bit commit-
ment of Kent [21] is not suitable as Kent proved in [20].
The main requirement for a bit commitment to be able
to force measurments is that committing to a bit b must
be equivalent to giving the classical bit b to a trusted
third party. Committing to a measurement result ac-
cording to [34,25] implies an irreversible measurement
as otherwise the cheater and the trusted third party to-
gether could violate the Heisenberg uncertainty.
In this section we will show that secret sharing can be
used like a black box bit commitment to force measure-
ments using the protocols of [34,25].
If we use, instead of bit commitment, secret sharing
with an access structure Z and let A be the set {A|Ac ∈
Z} then we have the following properties:
1. the bit commitment based on secret sharing is con-
cealing given only a collusion of {A|A 6∈ Z} is
cheating.
2. The bit commitment based on secret sharing is
binding if only one collusion of A is cheating.
3. The bit commitment based on secret sharing is
equivalent to announcing the bit to a trusted third
party whenever only one collusion of A is cheating.
The first two points of this enumeration follow directly
from the properties of secret sharing schemes. Now we
look at the third point. According to the assumption that
only one collusion of A cheats we know that there exists
a set M of honest players able to reconstruct the shared
secret. As all players of M are honest the committing
player (Alice) had to honestly transmit all the shares of
the players ofM . These shares already fix the committed
bit and hence handing out those shares is equivalent to
announcing the bit to a trusted third party. From this
the next result follows without further proof.
Lemma 19 Let A be an adversary structure and let Z
be an access structure such that A = {A|Ac ∈ Z}. Then
secret sharing with access structure Z can be used to ob-
tain A-partially robust oblivious transfer from any player
to the dealer. The protocol is {A|A 6∈ Z}-secure.
After the measurements are irreversibly performed and
the quantum attacks are impossible the bit commitment
used need not be binding any more. Only the concealing
property is still needed. For secret sharing the require-
ments for binding and concealing are different as seen in
the enumeration above. So after all measurements are
performed, especially after termination of the protocol,
only collusions from {A|A 6∈ Z} can cheat in the oblivi-
ous transfer.
Of course we want oblivious transfer not only from
one party to a set of players, but between every pair of
players. The next section will give a detailed analysis of
this situation.
VI. PARTIALLY ROBUST PROTOCOLS FOR
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
We will next give a detailed analysis of the situation
where we have a set P of players together with an ad-
versary structure A and every player should be able to
share a secret among the other players.
We are only concerned with partially robust protocols
here. Whenever a player complains about another player
we will abort the protocol. Robust protocols will be pre-
sented in the next section.
Lemma 20 Let P be a set of players for which each pair
of players is connected by an authenticated secure channel
and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let
A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions
cover the set P of players. Then a bit commitment be-
tween any pair of players is possible which is A-partially
robust and {Ac|A 6∈ A}-secure.
Proof: We will let Alice commit to a bit string m ∈
{0, 1}k.
Commit via Secret Sharing(m)
1. Alice sends Bob a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k.
2. Alice shares the string m⊕ r using a secret sharing
scheme with access structure Z = {Z|Zc 6∈ A}.
This protocol shares Alices secret m with the access
structure Z ∩ {M ⊆ P |Bob ∈ M}. If the receiver Bob
is honest this protocol can be used to force measure-
ments A-partially robustly (Lemma 19) and if Bob is not
honest then we cannot prevent a dishonest sender from
colluding and changing the committed bit together with
the receiver of the bit commitment. No bit commitment
scheme can.
The unveil protocol is essentially a reconstruction of
the shared secret.
Unveil
1. Alice announces the shares she sent. The players
from P confirm the shares and Bob can then recon-
struct m from his knowledge of r.
✷
We can improve the security a little bit further by not
allowing every player to commit a bit via secret shar-
ing. To obtain oblivious transfer between every pair of
players it is enough that for every pair of players one of
them can commit to the other as oblivious transfer can
be inverted [12].
Lemma 21 Let P be a set of players for which each pair
of players is connected by an authenticated secure channel
and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let
A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions
cover the set P of players and let M be any maximal set
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in A. Then for every pair of players a bit commitment is
possible for one of the players to the other player which
is A-partially robust and {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure.
Proof: The partial robustness is the same as claimed
by Lemma 20 so we need to prove only the improved
security.
We have to see first that {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c is an ad-
versary structure. The set {Ac|A 6∈ A} is an adversary
structure and it contains all proper subsets ofM c. Hence
the set {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c is an adversary structure, too.
To obtain the higher security we choose for every pair
of players one player who shall commit to the other. Let
Alice and Bob be a pair of players for which either Alice,
Bob∈ M , Alice, Bob6∈ M or Alice∈ M and Bob6∈ M .
Otherwise exchange the names of the players.
We will see that the bit commitment from Lemma 20
between any two players Alice and Bob is {Ac|A 6∈
A} ∪ M c-secure if used in the above defined direction.
As Lemma 20 already proves the {Ac|A 6∈ A}-security
we are left with proving the security against the possible
collusion M c.
A collusion can only cheat if it is an authorized set able
to recover a shared secret and if it contains the receiver of
the bit commitment as the shared secret is encrypted by
a key r only known to the sender and the receiver of the
bit commitment. If the collusion contains the sender of
the bit commitment then the committed bit can already
be derived from the inputs of the colluding players and
no security is lost.
The direction of the bit commitment is chosen in a way
thatM c either contains the sender of the bit commitment
or it does not contain the receiver of the bit commitment
and hence M c is not able to reconstruct a secret bit in
the bit commitment protocol. ✷
From Lemma 19, Lemma 21 , and [12] we get the fol-
lowing result about oblivious transfer.
Corollary 22 Let P be a set of players for which each
pair of players is connected by an authenticated secure
channel and every player has access to a broadcast chan-
nel. Let A be an adversary structure for which no two
collusions cover the set P of players and let M be any
maximal set in A. Then an oblivious transfer is possible
between every pair of players which is A-partially robust
and {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure.
VII. ROBUST PROTOCOLS FOR OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER
In this section we will additionally consider players who
try to disrupt the bit commitment protocol. In addition
to the forms of cheating partially robust protocols can
cope with we have that some players can leak out infor-
mation to players not contained in their collusion or some
players can claim that some other players do not follow
the protocol or they can themselves refuse to send or to
receive messages.
If one looks at a secret sharing scheme step by step
the only deviations of the protocol possible, which do
not immediately give away the identity of the disruptor,
are:
1. Some players might not keep their shares secret.
2. Some players complain that the sender presents dif-
ferent shares in the reconstruction phase then these
players originally received.
3. Some players can claim to not receive any proper
shares, e. g. empty shares.
This enumeration remains complete even if we consider
verifiable secret sharing as we essentially iterate secret
sharing together with some local computations (see Sub-
section II C).
If a disruption yields that the sender and the receiver
of a bit commitment are in conflict then we will abort
this bit commitment. We will not yet realize bit com-
mitments between players who are in conflict with each
other. We will later use multiparty protocols to obtain
bit commitment and oblivious transfer between players
who are in conflict.
Next we will give a bit commitment scheme based on
verifiable secret sharing which can cope with disruption.
Shares of complaining players will be published, but we
will see that this does not harm the security. Thye num-
ber k is a security parameter.
Commit via Secret Sharing(m)
1. Alice shares the secret m⊕ r with the access struc-
ture Z and sends r to Bob.
2. A set A complains about the shares they receive.
These shares will be published by Alice
3. Aold := A
4. repeat
(a) for j = 1 to k do
i. Alice shares a random secret z with the
access structure Z.
ii. Bob tells Alice to either open z or z⊕m⊕
r.
iii. Alice publishes the shares for z or z⊕m⊕
r. A set Aj of players complains about
these shares.
iv. A := A ∪ Aj
od
(b) If A 6∈ A then Alice is detected cheating else
Alice has to publish the shares for the secret
m⊕ r for all players in A.
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5. until Aold = A.
Lemma 23 Let P be a set of players and let A be an
adversary structure for which no two collusions cover the
set P \ {Pi} for any player Pi and let M be any maximal
set in A. Then a secret which is shared among the players
of P according to the above protocol with access structure
Z = {Z|Zc ∈ A} remains to be {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure
even if a collusion of A publishes their shares.
Proof: The security of a bit commitment scheme is
only relevant if the sender is honest. So we can assume
throughout the proof that the secret is properly shared.
Because no two collusions of A cover P \ {Pi} every
set of the access structure Z = {Z|Zc ∈ A} contains at
least two honest players. So even if all players of a col-
lusion A ∈ A leak their shares the secret remains shared
among at least two honest players and no single honest
but curious player gets to know a secret. ✷
Lemma 24 Let P be a set of players for which each pair
of players is connected by an authenticated secure channel
and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let
A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions
cover the set P \{Pi} for any player Pi and let M be any
maximal set in A. Then for every pair of players, who
will not be in conflict after the protocol, a bit commitment
is possible from one of the players to the other player
which is A-robust and {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure.
Proof: We are proving our claim using the above pro-
tocol. Whenever the receiver of the bit commitment
complains about the sender then we need not be able
to implement a bit commitment hence in the following
we analyse only conflicts between the sender of the bit
commitment and players other than the receiver.
We consider two cases.
First: Alice is honest, then every complaint about Al-
ice comes from a cheater and Alice publishes the share
the cheater complained about. So every complain about
an honest Alice is equivalent to a leak of the share of the
cheating player and we have seen that this does not harm
the security of the secret sharing (Lemma 23). The cor-
rectness of the secret sharing, which implies the binding
property of the bit commitment, cannot be harmed by
shares which become publicly known.
Second: Alice is dishonest. Then Bob must be hon-
est or we cannot expect a bit commitment to work. All
shares the public ones as well as the only privately known
ones pass the verifiable secret sharing test whenever the
protocol has terminated and Alice has not been detected
cheating. Hence every honest player is convinced that if
Bob is honest then the secret is properly shared. This
follows directly from the properties of the verifiable se-
cret sharing scheme of [4] which was sketched in Subsec-
tion II C. The security of the protocol is not an issue if
Alice is dishonest. ✷
From the same arguments as used in Lemma 19 it is
clear that the above bit commitment can be used to force
measurements. As the direction of an oblivious transfer
can be inverted [12] the directions of the bit commitments
do not matter any more. Hence we can conclude the
following.
Corollary 25 Let P be a set of players for which each
pair of players is connected by a quantum channel and
an authenticated insecure channel and every player has
access to a broadcast channel. Let A be an adversary
structure for which no two collusions cover the set P \
{Pi} for any player Pi and let M be any maximal set
in A. Then for every pair of players, who will not be in
conflict after the protocol, an oblivious transfer is possible
which is A-robust and {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure.
In the next section we will use the oblivious transfer of
this corollary to implement multiparty computations.
A. Main Results
This section is separated in two subsections the first
considering only partially robust protocols, i. e., protocols
which are aborted whenever a conflict occurs and the
second subsection deals with robust protocols tolerating
every form of cheating and disruption.
B. Partially Robust Protocols
Combining the results of Corollary 12, Corollary 22,
and [13] we get the following result without further proof.
Theorem 26 Let P be a set of players each having ac-
cess to a broadcast channel and let every pair of players
of P be connected by a quantum channel and an insecure
but authenticated classical channel. Then A-partially ro-
bust quantum multiparty protocols for all functions exist
if and only if no two collusions of A cover P .
These protocols are A˜-secure after termination if and
only if the adversary structure A˜ contains at most one
complement of a previously chosen set from A.
Secret sharing need not be efficient, but all other pro-
tocols used require only polynomial resources.
Corollary 27 If secret sharing can be implemented effi-
ciently for the access structure Z = {Ac|A ∈ A} then the
protocols of Theorem 26 can be efficient.
C. Robust Protocols
To obtain robust protocols we must according to
Lemma 14 choose A such that no two possible collusions
together contain all but one players. In this situation we
can use Lemma 7 together with Corollary 25 and obtain
the following result without further proof.
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Theorem 28 Let P be a set of players each having ac-
cess to a broadcast channel and every pair of players of
P being connected by a quantum channel and an insecure
but authenticated classical channel. Then A-robust quan-
tum multiparty protocols for all functions exist if and only
if no two collusions of A cover P \ {Pi} for any player
Pi.
These protocols are A˜-secure after termination if and
only if the adversary structure A˜ contains at most one
complement of a previously chosen set from A.
If we are interested in robustness after termination and
not security after termination we can use the following
result from [29] (for a proof see [29]).
Lemma 29 A multi party protocol which is A-secure af-
ter termination is B-robust after termination for B =
{B|∃A ∈ A : B ⊂ AandB 6= A}.
Again we need only polynomial resources if secret shar-
ing is efficient.
Corollary 30 If secret sharing can be implemented effi-
ciently for the access structure Z = {Ac|A ∈ A} then the
protocols of Theorem 28 can be efficient.
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